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1 A model of coopetitive games and the Greek
crisis
David Carf`ı, Daniele Schiliro`
Abstract
In the present work we propose an original analytical model of
coopetitive game. We shall try to apply this analytical model of
coopetition - based on normal form game theory and conceived at
a macro level - to the Greek crisis, suggesting feasible solutions in a
super-cooperative perspective for the divergent interests which drive
the economic policies in the euro area.
Keywords. Games and Economics, competition, cooperation, coopeti-
tion, normal form games
1 Introduction
In this contribution we focus on the Greek crisis, since we know that Greece is
still in a very difficult economic situation, due to its lack of competitiveness
and is at risk of insolvency, because of its public finance mismanagement.
Although the EU Governments and IMF have recently approved more sub-
stantial financial aids to cover the refinancing needs of Greece until 2014, in
exchange of a serious and tough austerity program. Germany, on the other
hand, is the most competitive economy of the Euro Area and has a large
trade surplus with Greece and other Euro partners; hence significant trade
imbalances occur within the Euro Area.
The main purpose of our paper is to explore win-win solutions for Greece
and Germany, involving a German increasing demand of a pre-determined
1
Greek exports. We do not analyze the causes of the financial crisis in Greece
and its relevant political and institutional effects on the European Monetary
Union. Rather we concentrate on stability and growth, which should drive
the economic policy of Greece and the other Euro countries.
Organization of the paper. The work is organized as follows:
• section 2 examines the Greek crisis, suggesting a possible way out
to reduce the intra-eurozone imbalances through coopetitive solutions
within a growth path;
• sections from 3 to 6 provides an original model of coopetitive game
applied to the Eurozone context, showing the possible coopetitive so-
lutions;
• conclusions end up the paper.
Introduction and Section 2 of this paper are written by D. Schiliro`, sec-
tions from 3 to 6 are written by D. Carf`ı; conclusions are written by the two
authors.
Acknowledgments. We wish to thank Daniela Baglieri, Albert E.
Steenge and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments and sug-
gestions.
2 The Greek Crisis and the coopetitive solu-
tion
The deep financial crisis of Greece, which was almost causing the default of its
sovereign debt, has revealed the weaknesses of Greek economy, particularly
its lack of competitiveness, but also the mismanagement of the public finance
and the difficulties of the banking sector.
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2.1 The crisis and the Greek economy
With the outbreak of the global crisis of 2008-2009, Greece relied on state
spending to drive growth. Moreover, the country has accumulated a huge
public debt (over 320 billion euros in 2010). This has created deep concerns
about its fiscal sustainability and its financial exposition has prevented the
Greek government to find capitals in the financial markets. In addition,
Greece has lost competitiveness since joining the European Monetary Union
and, because of that, Greek’s unit labor cost rose 34 percent from 2000
to 2009. The austerity measures implemented by the Greek government,
although insufficient, are hitting hard the Greek economy, since its growth is
expected to be negative also this year (2011), making the financial recovery
very problematic [Mussa, 2010]. Furthermore, Greece exports are much less
than imports, so the trade balance shows a deficit around 10%. Therefore,
the focus of economic policy of Greece should become its productive system
and growth must be the major goal for the Greek economy in a medium term
perspective. This surely would help its re-equilibrium process.
2.2 The soundest European economy: Germany
Germany, on the other hand, is considered the soundest European economy.
It is the world’s second-biggest exporter, but its wide commercial surplus is
originated mainly by the exports in the Euro area, that accounts for about
two thirds. Furthermore, since 2000 its export share has gradually increased
vis-a`-vis industrial countries. Thus Germany’s growth path has been driven
by exports. We do not discuss in this work the factors explaining Germany’s
increase in export share, but we observe that its international competitiveness
has been improving, with the unit labor cost which has been kept fairly
constant, since wages have essentially kept pace with productivity. Therefore
the prices of the German products have been relatively cheap, favoring the
export of German goods towards the euro countries and towards the markets
around the world, especially those of the emerging economies (China, India,
Brasil, Russia). Finally, since 2010 Germany has recovered very well from
the 2008-2009 global crisis and it is growing at a higher rate than the others
Euro partners.
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Therefore we share the view that Germany (and the other surplus coun-
tries of the Euro area) should contribute to overcome the crisis of Greek
economy stimulating its demand of goods from Greece and relying less on
exports towards the Euro area in general. Germany, as some economists
as Posen [2010] and Abadi [2010] underlined, has benefited from being the
anchor economy for the Eurozone over the last 11 years. For instance, in
2009, during a time of global contraction, Germany has been a beneficiary,
being able to run a sustained trade surplus with its European neighbors.
Germany exported, in particular, 6.7 billions euro worth of goods to Greece,
but imported only 1.8 billion euro worth in return.
2.3 A win-win solution for Greece and Germany
Thus we believe that an economic policy that aims at adjusting government
budget and trade imbalances and looks at improving the growth path of the
real economy in the medium and long term in Greece is the only possible one
to assure a stable re-balancing of the Greek economy and also to contribute
to the stability of the whole euro area [Schiliro`, 2011]. As we have already
argued, German modest wage increases and weak domestic demand favored
the export of German goods towards the euro countries. We suggest, in
accordance with Posen [2010], a win-win solution (a win-win solution is the
outcome of a game which is designed in a way that all participants can profit
from it in one way or the other), which entails that Germany, which still
represents the leading economy, should re-balance its trade surplus and thus
ease the pressure on the southern countries of the euro area, particularly
Greece. Obviously, we are aware that this is a mere hypothesis and that our
framework of coopetition is a normative model. However, we believe that
a cooperative attitude must be taken within the members of the European
monetary union. Thus we pursue our hypothesis and suggest a model of
coopetitive game as an innovative instrument to analyze possible solutions
to obtain a win-win outcome for Greece and Germany, which would also help
the whole economy of the euro area.
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2.4 Our coopetitive model
The two strategic variables of our model are investments and exports for
Greece, since this country must concentrate on them to improve the structure
of production and its competitiveness, but also shift its aggregate demand
towards a higher growth path in the medium term. Thus Greece should fo-
cus on innovative investments, specially investments in knowledge [Schiliro`,
2010], to change and improve its production structure and to increase its pro-
duction capacity and its productivity. As a result of that its competitiveness
will improve. An economic policy that focuses on investments and exports,
instead of consumptions, will address Greece towards a sustainable growth
and, consequently, its financial reputation and economic stability will also in-
crease. On the other hand, the strategic variable of our model for Germany
private consumption and imports.
The idea which is driving our model to solve the Greek crisis is based on a
notion of coopetition where the cooperative aspect will prevail. Thus we are
not talking about a situation in which Germany and Greece are competing in
the same European market for the same products, rather we are assuming a
situation in which Germany stimulates its domestic demand and, in doing so,
will create a larger market for products from abroad. We are also envisaging
the case where Germany purchases a greater quantity of Greek products, in
this case Greece increases its exports, selling more products to Germany. The
final results will be that Greece will find itself in a better position, but also
Germany will get an economic advantage determined by the higher growth
in the two countries. In addition, there is the important advantage of a
greater stability within the European Monetary system. Finally our model
will provide a new set of tools based on the notion of coopetition, that could
be fruitful for the setting of the euro area economic policy issues.
2.5 The coopetition in our model
The concept of coopetition was essentially devised at micro-economic level
for strategic management solutions by Brandenburger and Nalebuff [1995],
who suggest, given the competitive paradigm [Porter, 1985], to consider also
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a cooperative behavior to achieve a win-win outcome for both players. There-
fore, in our model, coopetition represents the synthesis between the compet-
itive paradigm [Porter, 1985] and the cooperative paradigm [Gulati, Nohria,
Zaheer, 2000; Stiles, 2001]. Coopetition is, in our approach, a complex theo-
retical construct and it is the result of the interplay between competition and
cooperation. Thus, we suggest a model of coopetitive games, applied at a
macroeconomic level, which intends to offer possible solutions to the partially
divergent interests of Germany and Greece in a perspective of a cooperative
attitude that should drive their policies.
3 Coopetitive games
3.1 Introduction
In this paper we develop and apply the mathematical model of coopetitive
game introduced by David Carf`ı in [7] and [6]. The idea of coopetitive game
is already used, in a mostly intuitive and non-formalized way, in Strategic
Management Studies (see for example Brandenburgher and Nalebuff).
The idea. A coopetitive game is a game in which two or more players
(participants) can interact cooperatively and non-cooperatively at the same
time. But even Brandenburger and Nalebuff, creators of coopetition, did
not defined precisely a quantitative way to implement coopetition in Game
Theory context.
The problem in Game Theory to implement the notion of coopetition is:
• how do, in normal form games, cooperative and non-cooperative inter-
actions can live together simultaneously, in a Brandenburger-Nalebuff
sense?
Indeed, consider a classic two-player normal-form gain game G = (f, >)
- such a game is a pair in which f is a vector valued function defined on a
Cartesian product E × F with values in the Euclidean plane R2 and > is
the natural strict sup-order of the Euclidean plane itself. Let E and F be
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the strategy sets of the two players in the game G. The two players can
choose the respective strategies x ∈ E and y ∈ F cooperatively (exchanging
information) or not-cooperatively (not exchanging informations), but these
two ways are mutually exclusive, at least in normal-form games: the two
ways cannot be adopted simultaneously in the model of normal-form game
(without using convex probability mixtures, but this is not the way suggested
by Brandenburger and Nalebuff in their approach). There is no room, in the
classic normal game model, for a simultaneous (non-probabilistic) employ-
ment of the two behavioral extremes cooperation and non-cooperation.
Towards a possible solution. David Carf`ı ([7] and [6]) has proposed
a manner to pass this impasse, according to the idea of coopetition in the
sense of Brandenburger and Nalebuff:
• in a Carf`ı’s coopetitive game model, the players of the game have their
respective strategy-sets (in which they can choose cooperatively or not
cooperatively) and a common strategy set C containing other strategies
(possibly of different type with respect to those in the respective classic
strategy sets) that must be chosen cooperatively. This strategy set C
can also be structured as a Cartesian product (similarly to the profile
strategy space of normal form games), but in any case the strategies
belonging to this new set C must be chosen cooperatively.
3.2 The model for n players
We give in the following the definition of coopetitive game proposed by Carf`ı
(in [7] and [6]).
Definition (of n-player coopetitive game). Let E = (Ei)
n
i=1 be a fi-
nite n-family of non-empty sets and let C be another non-empty set. We de-
fine n-player coopetitive gain game over the strategy support (E,C)
any pair
G = (f, >),
where f is a vector function from the Cartesian product ×E × C (here ×E
denotes the classic strategy-profile space of n-player normal form games, i.e.
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the Cartesian product of the family E) into the n-dimensional Euclidean
space Rn and > is the natural sup-order of this last Euclidean space. The
element of the set C will be called cooperative strategies of the game.
A particular aspect of our coopetitive game model is that any coopetitive
game G determines univocally a family of classic normal-form games and vice
versa; so that any coopetitive game could be defined as a family of normal-
form games. In what follows we precise this very important aspect of the
model.
Definition (the family of normal-form games associated with a
coopetitive game). Let G = (f, >) be a coopetitive game over a strategic
support (E,C). And let
g = (gz)z∈C
be the family of classic normal-form games whose member gz is, for any
cooperative strategy z in C, the normal-form game
Gz := (f(., z), >),
where the payoff function f(., z) is the section
f(., z) : ×E → Rn
of the function f , defined (as usual) by
f(., z)(x) = f(x, z),
for every point x in the strategy profile space ×E. We call the family g (so
defined) family of normal-form games associated with (or deter-
mined by) the game G and we call normal section of the game G any
member of the family g.
We can prove this (obvious) theorem.
Theorem. The family g of normal-form games associated with a coopet-
itive game G uniquely determines the game. In more rigorous and complete
terms, the correspondence G 7→ g is a bijection of the space of all coopetitive
games - over the strategy support (E,C) - onto the space of all families of
normal form games - over the strategy support E - indexed by the set C.
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Proof. This depends totally from the fact that we have the following
natural bijection between function spaces:
F(×E × C,Rn)→ F(C,F(×E,Rn)) : f 7→ (f(., z))z∈C ,
which is a classic result of theory of sets. 
Thus, the exam of a coopetitive game should be equivalent to the exam
of a whole family of normal-form games (in some sense we shall specify).
In this paper we suggest how this latter examination can be conducted
and what are the solutions corresponding to the main concepts of solution
which are known in the literature for the classic normal-form games, in the
case of two-player coopetitive games.
3.3 Two players coopetitive games
In this section we specify the definition and related concepts of two-player
coopetitive games; sometimes (for completeness) we shall repeat some defi-
nitions of the preceding section.
Definition (of coopetitive game). Let E, F and C be three nonempty
sets. We define two player coopetitive gain game carried by the
strategic triple (E, F, C) any pair of the form
G = (f, >),
where f is a function from the Cartesian product E × F × C into the real
Euclidean plane R2 and the binary relation > is the usual sup-order of the
Cartesian plane (defined component-wise, for every couple of points p and q,
by p > q iff pi > qi, for each index i).
Remark (coopetitive games and normal form games). The differ-
ence among a two-player normal-form (gain) game and a two player coopeti-
tive (gain) game is the fundamental presence of the third strategy Cartesian-
factor C. The presence of this third set C determines a total change of per-
spective with respect to the usual exam of two-player normal form games,
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since we now have to consider a normal form game G(z), for every element
z of the set C; we have, then, to study an entire ordered family of normal
form games in its own totality, and we have to define a new manner to study
these kind of game families.
3.4 Terminology and notation
Definitions. Let G = (f, >) be a two player coopetitive gain game carried
by the strategic triple (E, F, C). We will use the following terminologies:
• the function f is called the payoff function of the game G;
• the first component f1 of the payoff function f is called payoff func-
tion of the first player and analogously the second component f2 is
called payoff function of the second player;
• the set E is said strategy set of the first player and the set F the
strategy set of the second player;
• the set C is said the cooperative (or common) strategy set of
the two players;
• the Cartesian product E×F ×C is called the (coopetitive) strategy
space of the game G.
Memento. The first component f1 of the payoff function f of a coopet-
itive game G is the function of the strategy space E × F ×C of the game G
into the real line R defined by the first projection
f1(x, y, z) := pr1(f(x, y, z)),
for every strategic triple (x, y, z) in E×F×C; in a similar fashion we proceed
for the second component f2 of the function f .
Interpretation. We have:
• two players, or better an ordered pair (1, 2) of players;
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• anyone of the two players has a strategy set in which to choose freely
his own strategy;
• the two players can/should cooperatively choose strategies z in a third
common strategy set C;
• the two players will choose (after the exam of the entire game G) their
cooperative strategy z in order to maximize (in some sense we shall
define) the vector gain function f .
3.5 Normal form games of a coopetitive game
Let G be a coopetitive game in the sense of above definitions. For any
cooperative strategy z selected in the cooperative strategy space C, there is
a corresponding normal form gain game
Gz = (p(z), >),
upon the strategy pair (E, F ), where the payoff function p(z) is the section
f(., z) : E × F → R2,
of the payoff function f of the coopetitive game - the section is defined, as
usual, on the competitive strategy space E × F , by
f(., z)(x, y) = f(x, y, z),
for every bi-strategy (x, y) in the bi-strategy space E × F .
Let us formalize the concept of game-family associated with a coopetitive
game.
Definition (the family associated with a coopetitive game). Let
G = (f, >) be a two player coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic triple
(E, F, C). We naturally can associate with the game G a family g = (gz)z∈C
of normal-form games defined by
gz := Gz = (f(., z), >),
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for every z in C, which we shall call the family of normal-form games
associated with the coopetitive game G.
Remark. It is clear that with any above family of normal form games
g = (gz)z∈C ,
with gz = (f(., z), >), we can associate:
• a family of payoff spaces
(imf(., z))z∈C ,
with members in the payoff universe R2;
• a family of Pareto maximal boundary
(∂∗Gz)z∈C,
with members contained in the payoff universe R2;
• a family of suprema
(supGz)z∈C ,
with members belonging to the payoff universe R2;
• a family of Nash zones
(N (Gz))z∈C;
with members contained in the strategy space E × F ;
• a family of conservative bi-values
v# = (v#z )z∈C ;
in the payoff universe R2.
And so on, for every meaningful known feature of a normal form game.
Moreover, we can interpret any of the above families as set-valued paths
in the strategy space E × F or in the payoff universe R2.
It is just the study of these induced families which becomes of great
interest in the examination of a coopetitive game G and which will enable us
to define (or suggest) the various possible solutions of a coopetitive game.
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4 Solutions of a coopetitive game
4.1 Introduction
The two players of a coopetitive game G should choose the cooperative strat-
egy z in C in order that:
• the reasonable Nash equilibria of the game Gz are f -preferable than
the reasonable Nash equilibria in each other game Gz′;
• the supremum of Gz is greater (in the sense of the usual order of the
Cartesian plane) than the supremum of any other game Gz′;
• the Pareto maximal boundary of Gz is higher than that of any other
game Gz′;
• the Nash bargaining solutions in Gz are f -preferable than those in Gz′ ;
• in general, fixed a common kind of solution for any game Gz, say S(z)
the set of these kind of solutions for the game Gz, we can consider
the problem to find all the optimal solutions (in the sense of Pareto)
of the set valued path S, defined on the cooperative strategy set C.
Then, we should face the problem of selection of reasonable Pareto
strategies in the set-valued path S via proper selection methods (Nash-
bargaining, Kalai-Smorodinsky and so on).
Moreover, we shall consider the maximal Pareto boundary of the payoff
space im(f) as an appropriate zone for the bargaining solutions.
The payoff function of a two person coopetitive game is (as in the case
of normal-form game) a vector valued function with values belonging to the
Cartesian plane R2. We note that in general the above criteria are multi-
criteria and so they will generate multi-criteria optimization problems.
In this section we shall define rigorously some kind of solution, for two
player coopetitive games, based on a bargaining method, namely a Kalai-
Smorodinsky bargaining type. Hence, first of all, we have to precise what
kind of bargaining method we are going to use.
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4.2 Bargaining problems
In this paper we shall use the following definition of bargaining problem.
Definition (of bargaining problem). Let S be a subset of the Carte-
sian plane R2 and let a and b be two points of the plane with the following
properties:
• they belong to the small interval containing S, if this interval is defined
(indeed, it is well defined if and only if S is bounded and it is precisely
the interval [inf S, supS]≤);
• they are such that a < b;
• the intersection
[a, b]≤ ∩ ∂∗S,
among the interval [a, b]≤ with end points a and b (it is the set of points
greater than a and less than b, it is not the segment [a, b]) and the
maximal boundary of S is non-empty.
In this conditions, we call bargaining problem on S corresponding
to the pair of extreme points (a, b), the pair
P = (S, (a, b)).
Every point in the intersection among the interval [a, b]≤ and the Pareto
maximal boundary of S is called possible solution of the problem P .
Some time the first extreme point of a bargaining problem is called the initial
point of the problem (or disagreement point or threat point) and the
second extreme point of a bargaining problem is called utopia point of the
problem.
In the above conditions, when S is convex, the problem P is said to
be convex and for this case we can find in the literature many existence
results for solutions of P enjoying prescribed properties (Kalai-Smorodinsky
solutions, Nash bargaining solutions and so on ...).
Remark. Let S be a subset of the Cartesian plane R2 and let a and b
two points of the plane belonging to the smallest interval containing S and
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such that a ≤ b. Assume the Pareto maximal boundary of S be non-empty.
If a and b are a lower bound and an upper bound of the maximal Pareto
boundary, respectively, then the intersection
[a, b]≤ ∩ ∂∗S
is obviously not empty. In particular, if a and b are the extrema of S (or the
extrema of the Pareto boundary S∗ = ∂∗S) we can consider the following
bargaining problem
P = (S, (a, b)), (or P = (S∗, (a, b)))
and we call this particular problem a standard bargaining problem on S (or
standard bargaining problem on the Pareto maximal boundary S∗).
4.3 Kalai solution for bargaining problems
Note the following property.
Property. If (S, (a, b)) is a bargaining problem with a < b, then there is
at most one point in the intersection
[a, b] ∩ ∂∗S,
where [a, b] is the segment joining the two points a and b.
Proof. Since if a point p of the segment [a, b] belongs to the Pareto bound-
ary ∂∗S, no other point of the segment itself can belong to Pareto boundary,
since the segment is a totally ordered subset of the plane (remember that
a < b). 
Definition (Kalai-Smorodinsky). We call Kalai-Smorodinsky so-
lution (or best compromise solution) of the bargaining problem
(S, (a, b)) the unique point of the intersection
[a, b] ∩ ∂∗S,
if this intersection is non empty.
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So, in the above conditions, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution k (if it exists)
enjoys the following property: there is a real r in [0, 1] such that
k = a+ r(b− a),
or
k − a = r(b− a),
hence
k2 − a2
k1 − a1
=
b2 − a2
b1 − a1
,
if the above ratios are defined; these last equality is the characteristic property
of Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions.
We end the subsection with the following definition.
Definition (of Pareto boundary). We call Pareto boundary every
subset M of an ordered space which has only pairwise incomparable elements.
4.4 Nash (proper) solution of a coopetitive game
Let N := N (G) be the union of the Nash-zone family of a coopetitive game
G, that is the union of the family (N (Gz))z∈C of all Nash-zones of the game
family g = (gz)z∈C associated to the coopetitive game G. We call Nash path
of the game G the multi-valued path
z 7→ N (Gz)
and Nash zone of G the trajectory N of the above multi-path. Let N∗ be
the Pareto maximal boundary of the Nash zone N . We can consider the
bargaining problem
PN = (N
∗, inf(N∗), sup(N∗)).
Definition. If the above bargaining problem PN has a Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution k, we say that k is the properly coopetitive solution of the
coopetitive game G.
The term “properly coopetitive” is clear:
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• this solution k is determined by cooperation on the common strategy set
C and to be selfish (competitive in the Nash sense) on the bi-strategy
space E × F .
4.5 Bargaining solutions of a coopetitive game
It is possible, for coopetitive games, to define other kind of solutions, which
are not properly coopetitive, but realistic and sometime affordable. These
kind of solutions are, we can say, super-cooperative.
Let us show some of these kind of solutions.
Consider a coopetitive game G and
• its Pareto maximal boundaryM and the corresponding pair of extrema
(aM , bM);
• the Nash zone N (G) of the game in the payoff space and its extrema
(aN , bN);
• the conservative set-value G# (the set of all conservative values of
the family g associated with the coopetitive game G) and its extrema
(a#, b#).
We call:
• Pareto compromise solution of the game G the best compromise
solution (K-S solution) of the problem
(M, (aM , bM)),
if this solution exists;
• Nash-Pareto compromise solution of the game G the best com-
promise solution of the problem
(M, (bN , bM ))
if this solution exists;
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• conservative-Pareto compromise solution of the game G the
best compromise of the problem
(M, (b#, bM))
if this solution exists.
4.6 Transferable utility solutions
Other possible compromises we suggest are the following.
Consider the transferable utility Pareto boundary M of the coopetitive
game G, that is the set of all points p in the Euclidean plane (universe of
payoffs), between the extrema of G, such that their sum
+(p) := p1 + p2
is equal to the maximum value of the addition + of the real line R over the
payoff space f(E × F × C) of the game G.
Definition (TU Pareto solution). We call transferable utility
compromise solution of the coopetitive game G the solution of any
bargaining problem (M, (a, b)), where
• a and b are points of the smallest interval containing the payoff space
of G
• b is a point strongly greater than a;
• M is the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the game G;
• the points a and b belong to different half-planes determined by M .
Note that the above forth axiom is equivalent to require that the segment
joining the points a and b intersect M .
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4.7 Win-win solutions
In the applications, if the game G has a member G0 of its family which can
be considered as an “initial game” - in the sense that the pre-coopetitive
situation is represented by this normal form game G0 - the aims of our study
(following the standard ideas on coopetitive interactions) are
• to “enlarge the pie”;
• to obtain a win-win solution with respect to the initial situation.
So that we will choose as a threat point a in TU problem (M, (a, b)) the
supremum of the initial game G0.
Definition (of win-win solution). Let (G, z0) be a coopetitive game
with an initial point, that is a coopetitive game G with a fixed common
strategy z0 (of its common strategy set C). We call the game Gz0 as the
initial game of (G, z0). We call win-win solution of the game (G, z0)
any strategy profile s = (x, y, z) such that the payoff of G at s is strictly
greater than the supremum L of the payoff core of the initial game G(z0).
Remark. The payoff core of a normal form gain game G is the portion
of the Pareto maximal boundary G∗ of the game which is greater than the
conservative bi-value of G.
Remark. From an applicative point of view, the above requirement (to
be strictly greater than L) is very strong. More realistically, we can consider
as win-win solutions those strategy profiles which are strictly greater than
any reasonable solution of the initial game Gz0 .
Remark. In particular, observe that, if the collective payoff function
+(f) = f1 + f2
has a maximum (on the strategy profile space S) strictly greater than the
collective payoff L1 + L2 at the supremum L of the payoff core of the game
Gz0, the portion M(> L) of TU Pareto boundary M which is greater than
L is non-void and it is a segment. So that we can choose as a threat point
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a in our problem (M, (a, b)) the supremum L of the payoff core of the initial
game G0 to obtain some compromise solution.
Standard win-win solution. A natural choice for the utopia point b is
the supremum of the portionM≥a of the transferable utility Pareto boundary
M which is upon (greater than) this point a:
M≥a = {m ∈M : m ≥ a}.
Non standard win-win solution. Another kind of solution can be
obtained by choosing b as the supremum of the portion of M that is bounded
between the minimum and maximum value of that player i that gains more
in the coopetitive interaction, in the sense that
max(pri(imf))−max(pri(imf0)) > max(pr3−i(imf))−max(pr3−i(imf0)).
5 Coopetitive games for Greek crisis
Our first hypothesis is that Germany must stimulate the domestic demand
and to re-balance its trade surplus in favor of Greece. The second hypothesis
is that Greece, a country with a declining competitiveness of its products and
a small export share, aims at growth by undertaking innovative investments
and by increasing its exports primarily towards Germany and also towards
the other euro countries.
The coopetitive model that we propose hereunder must be interpreted as
a normative model, in the sense that it shows the more appropriate solutions
of a win-win strategy chosen by considering both competitive and cooperative
behaviors.
The strategy spaces of the two models are:
• the strategy set of Germany E, set of all possible consumptions of
Germany, in our model, given in conventional monetary unit; we shall
assume that the strategies of Germany directly influence only Germany
pay-off;
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• the strategy set of Greece F , set of all possible investments of Greece,
in our model, given in conventional monetary unit; we shall assume
that the strategies of Greece directly influence only Greece pay-off;
• a shared strategy set C, whose elements are determined together by the
two countries, when they choose their own respective strategies x and
y, Germany and Greece. Every z in C represents an amount - given in
conventional monetary unit - of Greek exports imported by Germany.
Therefore, in the two models we assume that Germany and Greece define
the set of coopetitive strategies.
6 The mathematical model
Main Strategic assumptions. We assume that:
• any real number x, belonging to the unit interval U = [0, 1], can repre-
sent a consumption of Germany (given in conventional monetary unit);
• any real number y, in the same unit interval U , can represent an in-
vestment of Greece (given in conventional monetary unit);
• any real number z, again in U , can be the amount of Greek exports
which is imported by Germany (given in conventional monetary unit).
6.1 Payoff function of Germany
We assume that the payoff function of Germany f1 is its gross domestic
demand :
• f1 is equal to the private consumption function c1 plus the gross in-
vestment function I1 plus government spending (that we shall assume
equal 0) plus export function X1 minus import function M1, that is
f1 = c1 + I1 +X1 −M1.
We assume that:
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• the private consumption function c1 is the first projection of the strate-
gic Cartesian cube U3,
c1(x, y, z) = x,
since we assume the private consumption of Germany the first strategic
component of strategy profiles in U3;
• we assume the gross investment function I1 constant on the cube U3
and by translation we can suppose I1 equal zero;
• the export function X1 is defined by
X1(x, y, z) = (1 + x)
−1,
for every consumption x of Germany; so we assume that the export
function X1 is a strictly decreasing function with respect to the first
argument;
• the import function M1 is the third projection of the strategic cube,
namely
M1(x, y, z) = z,
since we assume the import function M depending only upon the co-
operative strategy z of the coopetitive game G, our third strategic
component of the strategy profiles in U3.
Recap. We then assume as payoff function of Germany its gross domes-
tic demand f1, which in our model is equal, at every triple (x, y, z) in the
strategic cube U3, to the sum of the strategies x, −z with the export func-
tion X1, viewed as a reaction function with respect to the German domestic
consumption (so that f1 is the difference of the first and third projection of
the Cartesian product U3 plus the function export function X1).
Concluding, the payoff function of Germany is the function f1 of the cube
U3 into the real line R, defined by
f1(x, y, z) = x+ 1/(x+ 1)− z,
for every triple (x, y, z) in the cube U3; where the reaction function X1,
defined from the unit interval U into the real line R by
X1(x) = 1/(x+ 1),
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for every consumption x of Germany in the interval U , is the export function
of Germany mapping the level x of consumption into the level X1(x) of
German export corresponding to that consumption level x.
The function X1 is a strictly decreasing function, and only this mono-
tonicity is the relevant property of X1 for our coopetitive model.
6.2 Payoff function of Greece
We assume that the payoff function of Greece f2 is again its gross domestic
demand - private consumption c2 plus gross investment I2 plus government
spending (assumed to be 0) plus exports X2 minus imports M2),
f2 = c2 + I2 +X2 −M2.
We assume that:
• the function c2 is irrelevant in our analysis, since we assume the private
consumption independent from the choice of the strategic triple (x, y, z)
in the cube U3, in other terms we assume the function c2 constant on
the cube U3 and by translation we can suppose c2 itself equal zero;
• the function I2 is defined by
I2(x, y, z) = y + nz,
for every (x, y, z) in U3 (see later for the justification);
• the export function X2 is the linear function defined by
X2(x, y, z) = z +my,
for every (x, y, z) in U3 (see later for the justification);
• the functionM2 is irrelevant in our analysis, since we assume the import
function independent from the choice of the triple (x, y, z) in U3, in
other terms we assume the import function M2 constant on the cube
U3 and by translation we can suppose the import M2 equal zero.
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So the payoff function of Greece is the linear function f2 of the cube U
3
into the real line R, defined by
f2(x, y, z) = (y + nz) + (z +my) = (1 +m)y + (1 + n)z,
for every pair (x, y, z) in the strategic Cartesian cube U3.
We note that the function f2 does not depend upon the strategies x in U
chosen by Germany and that f2 is a linear function.
The definition of the functions investment I2 and export X2 must be stud-
ied deeply and carefully, and are fundamental to find the win-win solution.
• For every investment strategy y in U , the term my represents the quan-
tity (monetary) effect of the Greek investment y on the Greek exports.
In fact, the investments, specially innovative investments, contribute
at improving the competitiveness of Greek goods, favoring the exports.
• For every cooperative strategy z in U , the term nz is the cross-effect of
the cooperative variable z representing the additive level of investment
required to support the production of the production z itself.
• We assume the factors m and n strictly positive.
6.3 Payoff function of the game
We so have build up a coopetitive gain game with payoff function given by
f(x, y, z) = (x+ 1/(x+ 1)− z, (1 +m)y + z) =
= (x+ 1/(x+ 1), (1 +m)y) + z(−1, 1 + n)
for every x, y, z in [0, 1].
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6.4 Study of the game G = (f, >)
Note that, fixed a cooperative strategy z in U , the section game G(z) =
(p(z), >) with payoff function p(z), defined on the square U × U by
p(z)(x, y) = f(x, y, z),
is the translation of the game G(0) by the “cooperative” vector
v(z) = z(−1, 1 + n),
so that we can study the initial game G(0) and then we can translate the
various informations of the game G(0) by the vector v(z).
So, let us consider the initial game G(0). The strategy square S = U2
of G(0) has vertices 02, e1, 12 and e2, where 02 is the origin, e1 is the first
canonical vector (1, 0), 12 is the sum of the two canonical vectors (1, 1) and
e2 is the second canonical vector (0, 1).
6.5 Topological Boundary of the payoff space of G0
In order to determine the Pareto boundary of the payoff space, we shall use
the technics introduced by D. Carf`ı in [5]. We have
p0(x, y) = (x+ 1/(x+ 1), (1 +m)y),
for every x, y in [0, 1]. The transformation of the side [0, e1] is the trace of
the (parametric) curve c : U → R2 defined by
c(x) = f(x, 0, 0) = (x+ 1/(x+ 1), 0),
that is the segment
[f(0), f(e1)] = [(1, 0), (3/2, 0)].
The transformation of the segment [0, e2] is the trace of the curve c : U → R2
defined by
c(y) = f(0, y, 0) = (1, (1 +m)y),
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that is the segment
[f(0), f(e2)] = [(1, 0), (1, 1 +m)].
The transformation of the segment [e1, 12] is the trace of the curve c : U → R2
defined by
c(y) = f(1, y, 0) = (1 + 1/2, (1 +m)y),
that is the segment
[f(e1), f(12)] = [(3/2, 0), (3/2, 1 +m)].
Critical zone of G(0). The Critical zone of the game G(0) is empty.
Indeed the Jacobian matrix is
Jf (x, y) =
(
1 + (1 + x)−2 0
0 1 +m
)
,
which is invertible for every x, y in U .
Payoff space of the game G(0). So, the payoff space of the game G(0)
is the transformation of the topological boundary of the strategic square,
that is the rectangle with vertices f(0, 0), f(e1), f(1, 1) and f(e2).
Nash equilibria. The unique Nash equilibrium is the bistrategy (1, 1).
Indeed,
1 + (1 + x)−2 > 0
so the function f1 is increasing with respect to the first argument and anal-
ogously
1 +m > 0
so that the Nash equilibrium is (1, 1).
6.6 The payoff space of the coopetitive game G
The image of the payoff function f , is the union of the family of payoff spaces
(impz)z∈C ,
that is the convex envelope of the union of the image p0(S) (S is the square
U × U) and of its translation by the vector v(1), namely the payoff space
p1(S): the image of f is an hexagon with vertices f(0, 0), f(e1), f(1, 1) and
their translations by v(1).
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6.7 The Pareto maximal boundary of the payoff space
of G
The Pareto sup-boundary of the coopetitive payoffspace f(S) is the segment
[P ′, Q′], where P ′ = f(1, 1) and
Q′ = P ′ + v(1).
Possibility of global growth. It is important to note that the absolute
slope of the Pareto (coopetitive) boundary is 1+n. Thus the collective payoff
f1 + f2 of the game is not constant on the Pareto boundary and, therefore,
the game implies the possibility of a global growth.
Trivial bargaining solutions. The Nash bargaining solution on the
segment [P ′, Q′] with respect to the infimum of the Pareto boundary and the
Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution on the segment [P ′, Q′], with respect
to the infimum and the supremum of the Pareto boundary, coincide with the
medium point of the segment [P ′, Q′]. This solution is not acceptable from
Germany point of view, it is collectively better than the supremum of G0 but
it is disadvantageous for Germany (it suffers a loss!): this solution can be
thought as a rebalancing solution but it is not realistically implementable.
6.8 Transferable utility solution
In this coopetitive context it is more convenient to adopt a transferable utility
solution, indeed:
• the point of maximum collective gain on the whole of the coopetitive
payoff space is the point
Q′ = (1/2, 2 +m+ n).
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6.9 Rebalancing win-win best compromise solution
Thus we propose a rebalancing win-win kind of coopetitive solution, as it
follows (in the case m = 0):
1. we consider the portion s of transferable utility Pareto boundary
M := (0, 5/2 + n) + R(1,−1),
obtained by intersecting M itself with the strip determined (spanned
by convexifying) by the straight lines e2 + Re1 and
(2 + n)e2 + Re1,
these are the straight lines of maximum gain for Greece in games G(0)
and G respectively.
2. we consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky segment s′ of vertices (3/2, 1) -
supremum of the game G(0) - and the supremum of the segment s.
3. our best payoff coopetitive compromise is the unique point K in the
intersection of segments s and s′, that is the best compromise solution
of the bargaining problem
(s, (supG0, sup s)).
6.10 Win-win solution
This best payoff coopetitive compromise K represents a win-win solution
with respect to the initial supremum (3/2, 1). So that, as we repeatedly said,
also Germany can increase its initial profit from coopetition.
Win-win strategy procedure. The win-win payoff K can be obtained
(by chance) in a properly coopetitive fashion in the following way:
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• 1) the two players agree on the cooperative strategy 1 of the common
set C;
• 2) the two players implement their respective Nash strategies of game
G(1); the unique Nash equilibrium of G(1) is the bistrategy (1, 1);
• 3) finally, they share the “social pie”
5/2 + n = (f1 + f2)(1, 1, 1),
in a cooperative fashion (by contract) according to the decomposi-
tion K.
7 Conclusions
• The model of coopetitive game, provided in the present contribution,
is essentially a normative model.
• It has showed some feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective to
the Greek crisis.
• Our model of coopetition has pointed out the strategies that could
bring to win-win solutions in a cooperative perspective for Greece and
Germany.
We have found:
• a properly coopetitive solution, which is not convenient for Germany,
that is the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution on the coopetitive
Nash zone, set of all possible Nash equilibria of the coopetitive inter-
action.
• The final remarkable result of the work consists in the determination of
a win-win solution by a new selection method on the transferable utility
Pareto boundary of the coopetitive game.
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The solution offered by our coopetitive model:
• aims at “sharing the pie fairly”;
• shows a win-win and rebalancing outcome for the two countries, within
a coopetitive growth path represented by a non-constant sum game (for
instance on the Pareto boundary of the entire coopetitive interaction).
• Our analytical model allow us to find a “fair” amount of Greek exports
which Germany must cooperatively import as well as the optimal in-
vestments necessary to improve the Greek economy in this context,
thus contributing to growth and to the stability of both the Greek and
Germany economies.
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